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computational lying procedure. One that uses two Turing Machines. From there, I 
have argued that  such a procedure cannot be implemented in a Turing Machine 
alone. A fundamental difficulty arises, concerning the computational representation 
of the self-knowledge a machine should have about the fact that it is lying. Contrary 
to Morris’ claim, I have thus suggested that computers – as far as they are Turing 
Machines – cannot lie. Consequently, I have claimed that moral agency attribution 
to a robot or any other automated AI system, cannot be made, strictly grounded on 
imitating  behaviors.  Self-awareness  as  an  ontological  grounding  for  moral 
attribution must  be evoked.  This can pose a recognition problem from our part, 
should the sentient  system be the only agent  capable of  acknowledging its  own 
sentience. 
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Lying, computers and self-awareness
1. Computers and the act of lying
Since its inception in Alan Turing’s (1936) seminal paper «On Computable 
Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem», one could say that 
Computer Science has been for the most part, strictly concerned with the notion of 
truth making,  thus constructing machines able to follow inferential  processes.  A 
computer can, in fact, be recognized as a truth producing machine, as initially meant 
by David Hilbert when he considered for the possibility of a hypothetical machine 
capable of formulating all mathematical theorems in an automatic fashion (Chaitin,
1997). It was only when the world revealed too complex to be computed, at least in 
a feasible time, that the symbolic approach gave way to the conexionist strategy. 
Such direction had already been proposed in  the  early  forties,  during the Macy 
Foundation  Conferences,  with  the  McCulloch-Pitt  formal  neuron.  Following  the 
same line of research, the Perceptron would be built later, at the beginning of the 
sixties, from the seminal work of Rosenblatt. With increasing technical maturity, the 
conexionist approach would further develop into the neural network technologies 
(Dreyfus, 1988) that constitutes AI actual trends. 
Although truly promising, it must be emphasized that a neural network using 
rational numbers as its weight values is still computationally equivalent to a Turing 
Machine  (Siegelmann,  Sontag,  1995).  Consequently,  although the  computational 
power of a neural network surmounts that of a Turing Machine, once real numbers 
are used, I think the arguments here will hold, since they have more to do with the 
algorithmic  nature  of  artificial  intelligence  and  not  so  much  with  their 
computational power. 
Another  very  important  remark  concerns  the  adequacy  of  what  will  be 
suggested here, considering the recent work of Manuel, Elenore and Avrim Blum 
(2018). The authors have used Bernard Baars’ Theather of Consciousness model 
(Baars, 1997), describing human conscious awareness, to design what they called 
the Conscious Turing Machine definition.  The analogy with a  stage act  is  quite 
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straightforward: consciousness is defined as the content of what is being played in 
our short-term memory, understood as a stage. This staged content is then available 
to all unconscious (that is, out of the stage focus) processors in our brain. These 
processors are understood as a helping audience that sends further content to the 
stage to solve problems. The information sent by the processors to the short-term 
memory depend upon external sensorial input and whatever content was on stage, 
accordingly  with  some  structural  property  or,  somehow  equivalently,  encoded 
algorithm common to all unconscious processors. It is perhaps noticeable that the 
asserted definition of consciousness (what is in the stage) must include, in Manuel 
Blum own words (Blum, 2018), the existence of an inner speech – the faculty of 
talking to oneself. This is, in fact, what the acknowledgement of lying, underwent 
by  a  liar,  entails:  the  unrolling  of  an  inner  communication,  where  the  liar  is 
permanently reminding himself that he is not telling the truth. It  is this process, 
hypothetically  performable  by a  Turing Machine,  that  the  present  paper  tries  to 
analyze. Since each attending processor in the Blums’ model must comply to some 
algorithmic read/write strategy, as it reacts to its own inputs, I think the arguments I 
will  be  exposing  here  should  also  apply  to  the  Blums’s  theoretical  model  of 
algorithmic consciousness.
So, let me start by formulating the problem.
In 1976, the philosopher John Morris offered his analysis for «If computers 
could  ever  lie»  (Morris,1976).  Although  the  question  may  seem  of  a  strictly 
academic interest, I think it has a very serious contour we cannot afford to ignore. In 
fact, the problem may be said to be as old as Artificial Intelligence itself, in fact, 
being introduced even before Morris, in 1968, in Stanley Kubrick's movie ''2001, A 
Space Odyssey'', where HAL 9000 computer lies to David about the malfunctioning 
of  an  antenna.  The  movie  has  gathered  a  respected  circle  of  enthusiasts  in  the 
academy, as with ''HAL's Legacy'' (Clarke, edited by Stork ed., 1998), a book about 
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the  subject,  where  topmost  computer  scientists  theorize  about  HAL's  cognitive 
tasks, including its ability to feel emotions and, of course, to lie.
Consider  the  possibility  that  a  computer  has  gained  sentience,  not  at  all 
paired to the human familiar one. First, we will not notice it. In fact, it has come to 
mind that  the so-called singularity does not  have to be a disruptive event in an 
instant in time. It  can be otherwise a very long process, that has already begun, 
while no one was really noticing, simply because it is profoundly different from our 
own.  And  second,  if  so,  when  a  machine  would  output  the  statement  “I’m  a 
machine” (as opposite to a sentient self-conscious organism), if it would be true, it 
would be just a statement, thus devoided of any intentionality, and if it would be 
false,  it  would  be  an  assertion  and therefore  the  machine  would  be  lying.  This 
implies in a certain sense that we, as technology producing agents, may not be in 
control of whatever may happen in the future when it comes to AI. If not because 
we do not understand what we have created, then because what we have created has 
harnessed the ancient art of lying and deceiving. 
Contrary to Morris’ conclusion, my own analysis of the problem seems to 
suggest that a Turing Machine cannot, in fact, lie. I will claim that such capability 
also implies that the machine must be able to self-recognize that it is indeed lying. 
This self-recognition, according to the algorithmic representation of the act of lying 
that  I  will  be  presenting  here,  will  produce  a  contradiction  in  the  machine’s 
automated behavior.  Of  course,  this  only  means  that  autonomous intelligence is 
perhaps more complex than a very long and intricated algorithm, and again, that 
what  promotes  or  prevents  AI  may  well  be  behind  present  technological 
comprehension. Hence becoming a problematic ethical endeavor at the very least, 
should sentience appear unexpectedly.
Traditionally defended by philosophers in the sixties and early seventies, the 
deceptionist definition of lying poses that to lie is to make a statement one believes 
to  be  false,  while  intending  to  produce  in  the  listener  the  belief  that  it  is  true 
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(Meibauer, Mahon, 2018). However, such a plain definition may not be applicable 
to a computer since the machine may (or may not) lack a property one could easily 
equate to intentionality as a human agent normally would use it. 
In his paper Morris removed the term ‘statement’ from the definition above 
and instead used the word ‘assertion’. He then introduced three modes of discourse 
implicit to the act of lying, in his own words:
«1) The assertoric mode. The liar must assert something, for it to count as 
lying. Simply to mouth the words, as a person might do when reading 
from a book, is not to assert them, and therefore it cannot be lying.
2) The doxastic mode. The liar must believe something which contradicts 
his words. If he thinks that what he says is true, then he is not lying, even 
if  it  should  turn  out  that  he  has  spoken  falsely;  he  may  have  been 
speaking ignorantly, hastily, or carelessly.
3) The volitional mode. The liar must actually want his listener to believe 
his words; this is somewhat similar to the requirement in law that, to be 
convicted of fraud, a person must be shown to have intended to defraud 
his victim» (Morris,1976: 390-391).
Of course, the volitional mode may be thought redundant once the assertoric 
mode  has  been  stated.  The  reason  is  that  when  one  asserts  something,  there  is 
already an intention to cause belief in listeners, as assertionist philosophers would 
defend (1977, Chisholm, Feehan). I think Morris was thinking that to assert while 
lying implies the existence of a complex network of interlinked meanings, besides 
only wanting to cause belief in others, which he then considers a goal on its own, 
deserving to be stated as the assertoric mode. 
Showing that a computer can lie is then to show, as Morris put it, that it can 
assert, believe, and want. I think this is a very tall order, considering what a Turing 
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Machine  can  do.  Furthermore,  it  begs  for  very  strong  anthropomorphic 
interpretations  about  what  it  is  for  a  machine  to  assert,  believe  or  want.  To 
overcome these problems, Morris placed the onus of identifying an assertion made 
by a  computer  on the  external  reader,  rather  than on some internal  state  of  the 
machine. A printed statement would thus become such an assertion depending on 
the hermeneutical powers of the external reader, in some meaningful context and 
this type of criteria would then make it possible to say that a computer has asserted 
something and that it  can assert.  In effect,  it  can be said that it  is  exactly what 
happens when a human engages on a dialogue with a chatterbot or during a Turing 
test. 
However, engaging on a critical analysis about the alleged human powers to 
judge about the machine capacities, I have shown elsewhere (Castro, 2017) that a 
Turing test relies so strongly on the authority role of the human judge, that once 
such authority is placed in question, the test becomes undecidable. To conclude then 
that a computer makes an assertion, depending only on the appreciation powers of 
an  external  cognitive  agent  can  become  an  ambiguous  act,  to  say  the  least.  A 
stronger justification is needed.
As to the possibility of a computer wanting something, Morris plaid that a 
programmer can always embed a bias in the machine’s behavior by means of its 
program thus,  this  becoming or embedding a sort  of  recorded volition.  Again,  I 
think that saying that a computer desires something, based on such simple criteria, 
seems philosophically naïve and begs for a stronger justification.
Finally,  Morris holds that although a computer always believes in what it 
asserts (as it is strictly obeying an algorithm), it could find its way, as he argues, to 
dissemble «...the relationship between what it ‘intends’ to do and what it announces 
as its intentions, simulating the role of the volitional mode in a way that parallels the 
simulation of the doxastic mode» (Morris,1976, 398). It so happens that from what I 
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will describe in the next sections, it will become clear that this dissembling process 
cannot occur in a Turing Machine.
2. When is a Turing Machine lying?
John Morris pioneering analysis seems to have missed the inner meaning of 
what a Turing Machine is. A very simply automaton that proceeds, step by step, 
only  accomplishing  whatever  process  is  feasible  in  a  mechanical  way, 
independently therefore of the judgement powers of an external cognitive human 
agent.
To capture the meaning of the computational act of lying, we must therefore 
reappraise the problem of if computers can ever lie. We must ask, instead; in which 
circumstances would we say that a computer has lied or is lying to someone or to 
some other computer. In other words, we must find a formal acceptable definition 
for what can be acknowledged as the equivalent for the human act of lying, in a 
machine or, better and firstly, between machines.
We start by giving a comprehensive definition of a Turing Machine, that is; 
one  that  is  equivalent  to  the  usual  mathematical  one  (Boolos,  1989),  although 
adapted to our own purposes.
Definition 1, of a Turing Machine.
1.1.  A Turing  Machine  is  a  conceptual  mathematical  scheme,  representing  the 
automated action of a machine that follows a set of instructions. 
1.2. It is composed of a moving part P, representing the machine’s processor, and a 
very long tape T, divided in equal cells, representing the machine’s memory. 
1.3. For each instruction to be carried on by the Turing Machine, the processor P 
can read, erase or to write a symbol at a time, to move in the right or left direction a 
cell at a time or to stand still. 
  16
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 24, 2020  
Centre for Philosophy of Science of the University of Lisbon 
Lying, computers and self-awareness
1.4. The machine works using a finite set of symbols, called its alphabet Σ and its 
processor P can acquire a certain state from a finite set of states, called its state 
space S.
1.5. There is a symbol called the blank symbol, that stands for an empty cell when 
the machine is reading, and for an erasing action, when the machine is writing.
1.6. There is a finite set A of correspondence rules between the present state of the 
machine’s processor P together with the symbol presently written in the tape and 
ready to be read and what the machine will do next (among the actions described in 
1.3.), after reading the symbol in the tape. The set A is called the Turing Machine 
algorithm.
1.7.  The  Machine  always  acts  accordingly  to  the  following  computing  schema, 
respecting only the correspondence rules in the machine’s algorithm.
𝑅𝑆(𝑎1, 𝑆1) = 𝑆2 (1)
Meaning that if the Machine is in state  and reads the symbol , it will acquire 
the state , accordingly to the correspondence rule in (1).
𝑅𝑎(𝑎1, 𝑆2) = 𝑎2 (2)
Meaning  that  if  the  machine  is  in  state   (which  it  has  already  acquired, 
accordingly to (1)) and reads the symbol , it will write the symbol  on the tape, 
accordingly to the correspondence rule in (2). We are simplifying such a procedure, 
by  supposing  that  the  act  of  writing  automatically  erases  whatever  symbol  was 
written on the same cell of the tape, previously.
𝑅𝑀(𝑎2, 𝑆2) = 𝑀 (3)
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Meaning  that  if  the  machine  is  in  state   (which  it  has  already  acquired, 
accordingly to (1)) and reads the symbol  (which it is already written on the tape, 
accordingly to (2)), it will execute a movement M, as defined in 1.3., accordingly to 
the correspondence rule in (3). We are simplifying such a procedure, by supposing 
that to stand still is also a possible movement M.
The machine repeats the computing schema, which we are denoting by:
𝑅𝑆 → 𝑅𝑎 → 𝑅𝑀 (4)
until it fails to find a correspondence rule in the algorithm A for its present state and 
for the symbol presently written on the tape. If such situation occurs, the machine 
stops, or halts and we say that the computation defined by its algorithm has been 
performed. We are including the cases where the Machine abruptly stops from our 
point  of  view,  meaning  that  we  have  not  written  the  correct  algorithm for  the 
intended purposes.
1.8. If the machine, to our best knowledge, is unable to stop, we say that the task 
handled using its algorithm is a non-computable one.
Since  we  now  have  a  comprehensive  operational  definition  of  a  Turing 
Machine, we ask in what situation should we say that a machine has computed a lie, 
in  a  similar  way  one  would  say  a  human  has  lied.  To  try  and  keep  a  certain 
objectivity, let us suppose that such a situation (as it would be by a human agent) 
can  be  recognized  by  another  Turing  Machine.  The  question  is  now  in  what 
situation can a Turing Machine decide that another Turing Machine is lying.
First, one may assume that the natural way to externally analyze if a Turing 
Machine  is  in  fact  lying,  is  to  take  its  input  data,  output  data  and sequence of 
movements,  and  from  there  conclude  something  about  the  machine’s  truth 
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production  results.  This  is  the  mechanical  analogy  to  the  very  human  act  of 
observing if someone is lying. 
Before  we  can  proceed,  it  is  necessary  to  make  some  fundamental 
specification  about  the  nature  of  the  computational  process  that  will  be  herein 
described. Initially, the case where a monitoring Turing Machine is analyzing the 
behavior  of  another  Turing  Machine,  as  to  infer  a  lying  behavior  result,  would 
apparently be analogous to the case where that same monitoring machine would be 
inductively identifying the algorithm used by the first machine. In fact, inferring that 
such algorithm would not be the appropriate one. However, I will defend shortly 
that the procedure that I am about to define, trying to capture when has a Turing 
Machine lied, is not an algorithmically inductive one, but a procedure that tests for 
the computational consistency of a given presented behavior. The test is done from 
the standpoint  of  the analyzing Turing Machine and,  eventually,  can be used as 
motivation to relate the concept of “belief” to the computational one of a “relative 
consistency”. To see this, I will now give a very brief presentation of the inductive 
inference computational framework, returning to this point immediately after.
The  first  mathematical  definition  of  an  inductive  Turing  Machine  was 
introduced by Mark Burgin in 1983 (Burgin, 1983, 2017). It can be regarded as the 
algorithmic mathematical implementation of the seminal logical models for limiting 
recursive and limiting partial recursive function (Gold, 1965) and for trial-and-error 
predicates (Putnam, 1965). Inductive inference has been theorized in the context of 
automatic learning of languages (Gold, 1964) and automatic discovery. The later, 
concerning the identification of a program that computes a given function graph or 
that performs the identification of a “law of nature” type of formula (or sets of such 
formulas) given, either sequences of empirical results or sets of possible theorems to 
be, and from which an initial axiomatic structure producing the former is inferred 
(Blum and Blum, 1975; Costa, 2017).
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The computational spirit, if you will, of an automatized inductive procedure 
can be appreciated in the following definitions:
«A class of problems is called decidable if there is an algorithm which 
will give the answer to any problem of the class after a finite length of 
time (...) [there are] classes of problems that can be solved by infinitely 
long decision procedures in the following sense: An algorithm is given 
which, for any problem of the class, generates an infinitely long sequence 
of guesses. The problem will be said to be solved in the limit if, after 
some finite point in the sequence, all the guesses are correct and the same 
(in case there is more than one correct answer) » (Gold,1965: 28).
And, 
«Informally, an inductive machine is an algorithm which is given larger 
and larger samples of the graph of a partial or total recursive function 
which  the  machine  attempts  to  identify.  The  machine  or  algorithm 
produces  at  various  stages  a  program  which  computes  a  recursive 
function. The machine is said to identify the target function if at some 
point  it  produces  a  program which  computes  that  very  function,  and 
thereafter, no matter how much more of the graph of the target function it 
sees, continues to produce the same program. A weaker notion, that of 
behaviorally correct identification, does not require that to identify the 
target function the machine must converge to a single program. Instead, it 
requires only that the machine converges to a (possibly infinite) set of 
programs, all of which compute the target function» (Glymour, 1985: 23).
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Although  inductive  Turing  Machines  are  computationally  more  powerful 
than  plain  Turing  Machines  (Burgin,  2017,  Syropoulos,  2010),  it  has  been 
recognized from the study of mathematical  inductive inference models that  they 
have  upper  bound  computational  limits.  Using  Gold’s  terminology,  «In  general, 
subclasses  of  the  class  R  of  recursive  functions  [those  calculated  by  an 
implementable algorithm in a machine] cannot be identified in the limit by recursive 
functions  (Costa,  2017).  Furthermore,  if  one  now  includes  besides  functions, 
collections of theorems to be interpreted as recursively enumerable sets (that is, of 
each  its  elements  can  be  identified),  then  there  is  no  computationally  universal 
student  that  is  able  to  identify  (inductively)  everything  that  is  computationally 
identifiable. That is, each possible computational student can identify some sets and 
functions but not all sets and functions (Costa, 2017).
Now, getting back to what I intend to propose as a viable procedure effected 
by a watchful Turing Machine to identify when has a lie been produced by another, 
the  overall  strategy  will  be  as  follows.  We will  start  by  accepting  that  i)  both 
machines can always act upon any common given set of symbols, using the same 
set of available states,  the same alphabet of symbols and the same repertoire of 
movements, as described in Definition 1. This is a natural demand assuring that the 
machines are to communicate. Furthermore, it will also be accepted that ii) both 
machines will  use the same type of correspondence rules in their  algorithms, as 
defined  in  1.7,  although  not  necessary  the  same  rules  for  all  situations  and, 
consequently, not always the same algorithms. Metaphorically, conditions i) and ii) 
mean  that  the  machines  represent  cognitive  agents  sharing  a  common 
“computational  Culture”,  if  you will,  expressing different  views about  the  same 
topics.
To have a  debunking Turing Machine identify  the  production of  a  lie  by 
another Turing Machine, will imply firstly, that the former must act, accordingly to 
its own correspondence rules, upon the same set of symbols inputted and outputted 
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by the later. Secondly, it will also imply that the debunking Machine must compare 
the algorithm it has used to compute the symbols, inputted, and outputted by the 
lying Turing Machine, with the algorithm used by the later.  If  both diverge, the 
debunking Turing Machine will  decide for the “untruthfulness” of the procedure 
effected by the lying machine.
From what has just been said, the main issue in the suggested procedure is 
then not to identify (in a algorithmically inductive way or otherwise) what was the 
program (set of correspondence rules) that was used by the lying Turing Machine to 
produce its computation, but rather to assert, at some point of that computation, that 
the algorithm used by the lying Turing Machine is different from the one used by 
the debunking machine (upon the same set of symbols) and hence that the former 
must be lying.
Of course, in this framework, such a declaration implies that truthfulness (in 
a  quite  abstract  sense)  must  be  arbitrarily  (that  is,  in  a  manner  external  to  the 
devices) attributed to the debunking Turing Machine and making its “algorithmic 
point  of  view” the  authoritative  one.  This  invokes  the  question of  asserting the 
weight  social  accordance  may  have  on  selecting  between  what  is  commonly 
believed to be true and what is not. As it will become clear, the debunking Turing 
Machine will perform a kind of relative consistency check of the algorithm used by 
the lying Turing Machine. It will do so against its own algorithmic knowledge and 
grounded on its authority stand. 
Finally,  a  word  about  the  algorithmic  capabilities  of  an  inductive  Turing 
Machine,  performing  as  a  debunking  machine.  To  assert  that  the  lying  Turing 
Machine  is  not  telling  the  truth,  the  inductive  machine  output  results  would 
naturally have to diverge (in a finite number of steps) from the ones produced by the 
algorithm followed by the lying machine. Since an inductive Turing Machine starts 
its procedure by approaching the correct output, in general, from an initial different 
one, it will always (wrongly) identify a lie in a few steps of its computation.   
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In other words, in the scheme suggested here, the inductive computational 
powers of a debunking inductive Turing Machine will not be adequate to perform 
the  lying  identification  task,  as  it  will  perform  poorly  than  a  standard  Turing 
Machine. Hence, to perform as a debunking Turing Machine, an inductive Turing 
Machine must act as a simple Turing Machine, which means that the objections that 
will be posit concerning simple Turing Machines abilities to lie will also apply to 
inductive Turing Machines.
I now proceed to describe concretely what an analyzing Turing Machine must 
do in search for evidence that another machine has lied. 
For a debunking Turing Machine dTM to perform an analysis on the truth 
behavior of a possible lying Turing Machine lTM, let us suppose that a device can 
be coupled to lTM verifying the following conditions:
i) Whenever lTM reads a symbol from its own tape T, that symbol is written in a 
second tape T’. 
ii) Whenever lTM, writes a symbol in its own tape T, that symbol is written in a 
second tape T’.
iii)  Whenever lTM makes a movement M along its own tape, that movement is 
correspondingly represented by a written symbol  in a second tape T’ (e.g., R, for 
right, L for left and N for no movement). 
iv) All symbols are written in T’ in the same sequence as the one taken by lTM 
during its operation accordingly to the computation schema described in 1.7.
v) T’ is the input tape to be analyzed by the debunking Turing Machine dTM.
In the following we will accept, as a matter of principle, that the dTM can be 
programmed  to  proceed  as  it  will  be  suggested.  As  we  will  see,  the  intended 
procedures  are  quite  reasonable  for  a  Turing  Machine  to  perform.  Furthermore, 
perhaps more stringently, we will demand the dTM to be able to output, in some 
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suitable form of coding, the internal states representation within the correspondence 
rules in its own algorithm.     
Let us say the dTM has inputted the same initial symbol , as the lying Turing 
Machine lTM. Now, according to its own algorithm, and following the computing 
schema described in 1.7., lTM outputs the symbol . The watchful dTM inputs the 
newly written symbol  from T’, and promptly looks within its own algorithm for a 
correspondence rule, verifying:
𝑅𝑎(𝑎1, 𝑆′1) = 𝑎2 (5)
 
If dTM encounters such a rule, it will of course infer that lTM’s initial state was.
Still  following its own algorithm, and having outputted the symbol ,  lTM 
now exhibits a movement M. Again, the watchful dTM inputs from the tape T’ the 
corresponding symbol , and looks within its own algorithm for a correspondence 
rule, verifying:
𝑅𝑀(𝑎2, 𝑆′′1) = 𝑀 (6)
From this last rule, dTM infers that the lying Turing Machine’s initial state was .
At this point, it becomes clear that the only way to “catch a lie”, so to speak, 
in  this  situation,  is  to  compare  states   and .  Since,  according to  the  computing 
schema described in 1.7, the initial state of lTM can only be one and the same, and 
if  and  are two possible values for the same initial state in (5) and (6), then they 
must necessarily be equal. Hence, if they are different, we will say that the analyzed 
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Turing Machine has computed a lie or, for short, that it has lied. We can thus, write 
in a more systematic way:
Definition 2, of when a Turing Machine has lied.
Given an analyzable Turing Machine and a debunking Turing Machine, given 
that i) the two machines can always act upon any common given set of symbols 
using the same set of available states, the same alphabet of symbols and the same 
repertoire of movements, as described in Definition 1 and that ii) both machines will 
also use the same type of correspondence rules in their algorithms, as defined in 1.7, 
although  not  necessary  the  same  rules  for  all  situations  and,  consequently,  not 
always the same algorithms, the first is said to have computed a lie or to have lied to 
the second, if the debunking Turing Machine, from the behavior of the first, has 
outputted  an  expression  asserting  the  fact  that  it  was  not  able  to  find  any 
correspondence rules, in its own algorithm, for which:
𝑆′1 = 𝑆′′1 (7)
Where  is the initial state of the analyzable Turing Machine, as defined in 1.7
This definition calls for the following remark about consistency checking. 
One  might  be  led  to  believe  that  as  the  debunking  Turing  Machine  has 
identified an inconsistency in  the lying Turing Machine procedure which would 
therefore imply that the later could not have computed anything, in the first place. 
However,  this  is  not  true  since  such  consistency  appraisal  is  not  absolute  in  a 
universal computational sense (the debunking Turing Machine is not a universal 
algorithm that checks for consistency in any conceivable situation). Its verification 
proceeds only in relation to the debunking machine’s own algorithmic knowledge. 
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What happened was that the lying Turing Machine used a different algorithm to 
perform the computation as observed by the debunking Turing Machine. The lying 
Machine used other correspondence rules, different from the ones found by dTM to 
be the adequate ones for the inputted and outputted symbols, let us say:
𝑅′𝑎(𝑎1, 𝑆′′′1) = 𝑎2 (8)
And
𝑅′𝑀(𝑎2, 𝑆′′′1) = 𝑀 (9)
Consequently,  the  debunking  machine  identified  what  can  be  called  an 
erroneous procedure only once compared to the algorithmic information contained 
in  its  own  algorithmic  data  bank.  Once  more,  the  discussion  evokes  the  very 
important philosophical problem of knowing from whom, where or what emanates 
the authority to define what is or is not true. I will not dwell with that difficulty here. 
I  will  simply  accept  that  in  the  given  situation,  the  debunking  Turing  Machine 
proceeded in a possible acceptable and truthful way. 
Definition 2. tries to capture the inner spirit of a lie in so much that the lines 
of thought of the liar and of the receiver, in relation to the same narrative (in the 
case, the symbols read and written, and the movement of the machine), are different. 
To lie and to ear a lie is therefore, as far as this definition goes, an exercise of 
relativeness. As already noted, one which, most critically, depends on the fact that 
only one Turing Machine has performed truthfully. In this manner, it can be said 
that  the  computational  act  of  lying  corresponds  to  the  existence  of  different 
algorithms, running in two, otherwise, equal Turing Machines, where only one of 
them authoritatively encloses the truth. 
3. Self-deception and computability
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 Since we have found an effective procedure, making it possible for a Turing 
Machine to identify a lie from the output behavior of another Turing Machine, it 
seems that Turing Machines can, in fact, lie. However, there is more to it. 
In the first place, the above procedure can be easily equated with the situation 
where  two  cognitive  agents  disagree  one  with  the  other.  The  same  operatorial 
definition could be given for a disagreement identification,  performed by Turing 
Machine, while analyzing another. 
But even if, at a basic computational level, to lie could be characterized as a 
particular  kind  of  disagreement  between  two cognitive  agents,  there  is  a  major 
difficulty  that,  I  think,  makes  lying  something  very  different  from  a  purely 
mechanical act. The problem begins with the remark that when one lies, one seems 
to be aware that one is lying. The liar knows that he is lying, and this has profound 
logical implications for a Turing Machine. 
To start arguing about this point, I take the act of self-deception, which is a 
situation where a person tries to lie to oneself, denying something that the same 
person does not wish to acknowledge. Although this situation is different from lying 
to someone else, I think it rather illustrates the fact that a sort of self-monitoring 
process is at play when a human cognitive agent lies. I am, thus, suggesting that the 
same mental process of self-monitoring is always active when someone lies, either 
to himself or to others. The only difference being that in the act of self-deception, 
the self-monitoring process may be easier to identify by an external observer. In the 
paper «On the Psychology of Self-Deception» David Shapiro notes, in fact, that:
«Self-deception  can  easily  seem  paradoxical.  How  can  the  knowing 
deceiver also be the unknowing deceived? How can one intentionally, 
knowingly, not know? The process clearly requires a selective monitoring 
of oneself, and that selectiveness is usually taken to imply both knowing 
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what must not be known and at the same time being able not to know it. » 
(Shapiro, 1996, 786)
About someone who is self-deceiving himself, he also says that:
«The  speaker's  voice  is  often  louder  than  his  normal  conversational 
voice. He does not seem to be looking at one in the ordinary way. The 
listener does not seem to be in his focus; he seems to be looking past him. 
One feels tempted to wave one's hand to catch the speaker's attention. His 
attention seems inward, in the way of someone listening to himself, like a 
person who is practicing a speech (…) He is addressing himself through 
the listener. » (Shapiro, 1996, 789-790)
That a self-monitoring process is, in fact, active, when a human cognitive 
agent lies, poses an unsurmountable difficulty for a Turing Machine, for, consider 
the following. If such a process would be active in the machine, that would mean 
that the machine would have to acknowledge both what is the truth and what is not. 
This  simply accounts  to  apply the procedure leading to  definition 2,  of  when a 
Turing Machine has lied, to the machine itself. Let us do just that and see what 
happens.
Now the debunking Turing Machine dTM coincides with the lying Turing 
Machine. So, again, let us say the machine inputs the initial symbol  (from its own 
tape).  According  to  its  own  algorithm,  and  following  the  computing  schema 
described  in  1.7.,  the  automata  outputs  the  symbol  .  Then,  it  inputs  the  newly 
written symbol  and promptly looks within its own algorithm for a correspondence 
rule, verifying:
𝑅𝑎(𝑎1, 𝑆′1) = 𝑎2 (10)
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It obviously encounters such a rule, because it has computed thus far, using as its 
input  and outputting . That is, the Turing Machine finds the rule:
𝑅′𝑎(𝑎1,𝑆′′′1) = 𝑎2 (11)
From this it infers that its initial state was  and, of course:
  𝑅𝑎 ≡ 𝑅′𝑎 (12)
Meaning that both the searched correspondence rule and the one found are the same 
rule. This implies:
  𝑆′1 = 𝑆′′′1 (13)
Proceeding with its own algorithm, and having outputted the symbol , the machine 
makes a movement M. Let us suppose that whenever it moves, the machine writes 
the proper representative symbol . The automaton now inputs it, and looks within its 
own algorithm for a correspondence rule, verifying:
𝑅𝑀(𝑎2, 𝑆′′1) = 𝑀 (14)
Evidently, it finds it, since the machine has just moved accordingly, after having 
inputted the symbol . Hence, the Turing Machine finds the rule:
𝑅′𝑀(𝑎2, 𝑆′′′1) = 𝑎2 (15)
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From this last rule, the Turing Machine infers that its initial state was , and again:
 𝑅𝑀 ≡ 𝑅′𝑀 (16)
Meaning that  both the searched correspondence rule  for  movement  and the one 
found are the same rule. Once more, this implies:
  𝑆′′1 = 𝑆′′′1 (17)
Which, finally, leads to:
   𝑆′1 = 𝑆′′1 (18)
If we now recall Definition 2, we conclude that for a Turing Machine to be 
lying, condition (18) must be false, which is obviously not the case. Consequently, 
we  have  concluded,  using  Definition  2,  that  a  Turing  Machine  cannot  possibly 
output that it is, itself, lying. We will rephrase this by loosely saying that a Turing 
Machine cannot have any knowledge that it is lying, while it is lying. In the present 
framework,  lying  awareness  and  self-deception,  therefore,  seem  to  be  non-
computable actions for a Turing Machine.
4. Conclusions
So, can a computer lie? That is, can a Turing Machine lie? Based on what we 
have reasoned,  the answer must  be no.  To lie,  a  cognitive agent  must  have the 
knowledge that he is lying. Not only, because, phenomenologically, that is what we 
assert, but also because an agent can only become morally accountable for his own 
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lie - and thus, truly, a liar - if he knows that he is lying. It is the effectiveness of such 
knowledge that makes a lying agent become a moral agent.
Presently,  there  is  deep  concern  about  the  moral  obligations  and 
responsibilities  attributable  to  automaton  behavior  (Gunkel,  2017).  When  an 
industrial robot kills a man or when an automated car runs over a person, who is to 
blame,  the  machine’s  constructor,  its  users,  or  the  machine?  Does  intelligent 
autonomy  in  a  machine  wrap  entirely  the  question  or  should  we  demand  self-
awareness as the ontological basis from which we can say that a robot has become 
morally accountable? And how should we define self-awareness in a machine, if it 
happens to be a kind of non-computable property, at least, in the Turing Machine 
sense?
I think most of these questions about the machines ethical framing, brought 
about by AI, are presently associated with two common ground beliefs coming from 
tradition. First, that the further away a living organism is from a human being, the 
lesser it has moral rights, duties or, even, any ethical dignity, as comparable to us. 
Second, that every living organism is, in fact, also a machine. I think AI developers, 
hence, see robots to be just imitating machines devoided of any moral agency. That 
is,  devices  deprived  of  any  organicity.  In  short,  on  one  hand,  they  are  only 
mechanically imitating living systems and, on the other,  they are sufficiently far 
from us to be “justly” deprived of any ethical dignity. 
The problem, of course,  is  that  such beliefs may be plain wrong. Animal 
ethics surely may shed some doubt about the ethical dignity issue (Singer, 2001) 
and, for the second, it is not at all clear at what level of complexity does a machine 
become a living organism. 
Considering that a computer cannot lie, I suggest that moral agency cannot be 
attributed to a robot or any other automated AI system, based only on its imitating 
skills  of  human  behavior.  We  must  instead  take  into  account  what  I  am  also 
suggesting to be a non-computable property – in the Turing Machine sense – that is, 
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the property of self-awareness. The problem, however, is that this property seems to 
be only recognizable from an inner phenomenological point of view. That is, only 
the self-aware being knows that he is self-aware. If this is true, we risk missing 
moral  attribution to  a  sentient  robot,  one that  has  transcended its  computational 
limitations. 
The  so-called  AI  singularity  has  been  supposedly  considered  to  be  a 
disruption in historical time, corresponding to some enlightening isolated moment 
in computer science. 
On  the  contrary,  I  suggest  that  such  singularity  may  be  the  result  of  an 
evolutionary process, that has already begun with the aid of human intervention, 
storing unpredictable results in the future. As such, the act of lying may then be 
thought as a possible signature of a new phenomenological state in a robot’s mind, 
so-to-speak. That is, the signature of one possible high-level behavior that a sentient 
organism may exhibit. 
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